

ASW creates det-I where we found (mainly)
a threat of FS to SU (det-II vs. AWS/SU)

Local FS-threat "Morp" } in conflict
 (+) very good det-I ("Morp") }
 esp. with some
 unhedged (FS fear)
 on our side,
 and more with
 unhedged on both.

(NEVER)
 MAD without D-L/FS
 With minimum focus on both (no, no ASW)
max det I for both good C3 (kind)

Some det II ("weak, LNW/rapid defense
not threat of destroying SU
 not much of even attacking SU
 (less of hit-for-take
 "we'll do it -
 no. aggression")

no way to ^{use} limit etc
 (by threat of FS)

Dollar Auction!

(don't respond to with FO
 or second-use!)

No regime change (TCS barriers) conventional defense
 and/or: Little Baku, KASHMIR, or our threats

(Not anyone is under threat of attack, overwhelming, pure all

(11)

ADW wrong:

Simply ~~proposing~~ assuming SU of
calculated from SO FS > WWT (York) = 20M
does not 1) make SU FS "irrelevant" in all cases
but also 2) assume US of distance (or Type I)
or 3) maximum distance (Type I)
see ADW consideration of immutability of (supposed)
MAD longevity vs. crisis! (or D-C, CF...)

see R-244? R-266 R-290 AE

Force, ~~unavailable~~ FS force (unavailable)
does not assume or maximum det-I;
(or Type I, if SU is not unavailable)

and a unavailable FS force (or not dead)
requires det-I (danger of ^{without fear} primitive attack
or ongoing, prompt)

To increase det-I, massing every is
at least / more? like, covering for CF)
as important as

as decreasing increases;
Rounding doesn't work
"mutually" interest? But USG/NATO felt FS threat was essential -
the more credible, (if forces are unavailable
and SU's are too -)
1CSH,
(if unavailable, the more it avoids,
not effective - frustration, requires det-I. Det II tends to
SU is unavailable conflict back det-I.
/ which version?)

12-15-15

5

With large sales forces at sea -
going on alert

AM

can only be for prompt } FS
or punishment }

then averaging (i.e. Otha's acceptance of
value of punishment) prompt by Otha
(earlier the better - if it makes
any difference at all)

which it doesn't, better US + SU

(Pak. India, yes
or maybe)

Even Kang forces to go on alert (less, as
part of continuous sub alert-at-sea -
is what operations means??)

has the effect

if punishment is believed (by Otha)
to have value

as distinct from threatening - to go on alert
to prompt

12-12-15

See US with pressure for disruption!

3

(P-II?!)

Only use!

= SU — if permitted, in doctrine
(esp. after 1991?! (out of control?!
before?
see C-II!

We maintained SU CP observation with
control!

Suppression of news!
(as. hist! therefore...)
"some darkly lt."

Pak! India!

Regional unhappy (formal? no — no one every, yet!
limits ^{with} ~~from~~ regional from unhappy for news!
Homan (Pak?)

Unit
in 80's

Planning surprise attacks (like US in 50's?)

to planned surprise attacks (in 80's: longer?)

"striking back first" —

SU: promptly { provocation on US territory there
start { start
or preventive war LOFV
any kind / crisis of US imminent
attack

(not imminent arrival
of warheads

but ... imminent launch
/ how long?

or war ...

// or US intention in
uprising: Poland 1981

earlier: GDR ...

(like USCP)

Py 26

USCP:

61

1981

Polish army moving into
Germany: (not fine GDR?)

→ East or West?

East joins?

2
12-11-15

~~Compare~~

Does USAF still believe in value of
promptness in rear operations?

D-L

Wscap

CF - not as
cap, but
in attack?

Who?

What crisis?

On what basis?

Others: so that
future

In esc?

FU?

Now? I want?

(any?!) USMC?

12-2-15

Building a house of cards, higher + higher,
but with some glue & lots of tape,
downer stable than at books, tilting but standing
in some strong breezes, until, eventually...

disappointing that (us.?)
attack on NWWS ^{so only}
_{not}
attack on small NWS
attack on US in Dinosaur

Antiques

AA

Tuesday 12-15-15. / 1

Basically, two ^{or} kinds of alerts

- two purposes

- different cost; different signal
" message

1) to retaliate (give certainty, occurrence,
of having been attacked,

3 types? 2) to ⁽²⁾ strike first; ^(b) or preempt

a + b have to distinguish (before ^{at 10/4} ~~at~~ of attacks' vehicles
as ^{low} ^(b) may want to be seen, or most have launched,
as capability at least,
to deter)

With only planes, it looks like (2).

- If you can, you want adequate force to deter
(but this depends, for obliging, on your FS cap / appearance / threat)
and its universality
(^{at sea,} ~~Existent D-4 - not~~)

continuously, not requiring alert ^{credible;}
^{about vehicles)}

- AA was not only preventing FU - it implied moderation
to preempt - strike first (out of doc;
if US and alert, it would be indistinguishable
from 2(b). (= mobilization in WWI)

12-15-05

2

(What are visible differences between
DEFLON 2 and 1 ?!

Post crisis did not explode, because
1 side did not go to high alert!

U-2 60

Berlin 61

Cuba-II How aware was SO of US alert?

1969:

" " " " " "

1983 Private choice not

\$

others...

Blair
Sagan

Have both sides ever gone on high alert?

- Still not certain to erupt: but (like WWII,
mobilization) hair-trigger: slightest (incident,
unweathered, unattended to) wrong "signal" will
tip.

訓

8

to support Bank of EU in VN

Ranger

(PsyOps - influence and)

AA83 initially did this, - but not
without US Kripin Budget will come
target!

i.e. intent during crisis!
to prompt if possible

} su comente

Culra-II; but SU did not (think, feel)
What if!

1995

World Pay Game
recovered ^v about? OR? — 1991 - to US about?! Crisis/Corp

12-15-15

9

Sorting as US looks in prompt,

the alert by SU/R

encourages alert by US

a) if we know of R alert

b) if we're aware of Pay/Family/
forms
listening! "R my friend"?

TCS - Reinforced them

(My: Political use of workers.)

R had ability to "use" workers
(N wanted it)

What did it do for us?

SU's "Lesson of Barbarossa (Munich):

"Don't want for workers to attack!"

But that's one thing in WWII (pre-war)

National

First-strike prompt as. Superior does not big

winning, or improve its chances, or avoid total destruction

it is not advantageous: either to any "power," or big strike, of bravely, or postwar.

12-15-15

44 (12)

ASUS did not make SU FS exhaustion
in all circumstances

new model for (limited) proposals,
as interpreted by USAT or in combination
with USAT programs

Wrong then: ~~is~~

[like combining Midnighter with first-strike
MX (or low, multiple MX, or Secret D-4)
CORE: rather than instead of MX CF
1984³
late 1984

Ditz did not depend solely on
"survivable, second-strike" capability
on with price

as 1983 showed!

(not, 1962, for US vs. SU)

SU would mistake, for C-II: build up
(like USAT) both 2nd-strike cap. (sound)
along with FS cap.!

More dangerous for SU both to have
(both cap.) than for US alone
to both, + unreal

and more dangerous for SU to have FS cap. than

we didn't know;
not 4, RAND, not
on first or
primary

as for US, because the deal on low strong production
for production than or products did (at high SU levels
(NOT production was was expensive, NOT IKE's
or JEK's

12-7-15

*

Wanted my under of news — but
survivable ones — military quarters against/
deton attack from a news that was big,
— as well as
— as was being first about to be

Have front/
event one

— attached (news): (small of large)
— occupied

"trial / prompter"
is there crime?

— disappointed! (+ still back weeks
see Dr. S)

(SU in 83

China is 62 out national

On 33:
33:

not "conceivable" / blackmarket

not just OBL, AQ,
ISIS —

(see Kellin or AVL F)
DRV

"not determinable"

→ not comparable

conceivable?

unstable

* and, the more PS / prompter ones you
display — the greater the difference in
numbers that the opposite forces in PS is.
S-S — the more chance you will force
the situation of being attacked — the
less you will attack (Type I) — though
you are endless Type II (love cases —
NATO/USAT since

12-7-15

2

1958-61-

NATO/US PS cap. did not learn
Type I (as AWW would it would,
if/assuming SU had PS force)

It was "safe" (express against
false alarm, neutral...)

Because K had no
FS

but by, say, 1969

(dispute on what is Dark Noise)
(if SU would on about...)

N that was "moral"

vs. SU, even if it did not
to US & EU with limited response -
just that would have been would
risk for the

even though US did not have a PS cap -
SIOP-63 - "90 M response"
(in US? What?)

WHY Able Archer, in 80's?

Doing deliberate?

Why in 83?

Why then on EU -

intensity?!

Did SU do this? (Meyer!)

Provoked annihilation / probes?

P-II!

Alibi Arab

1 Pearl Harbor Day
12-7-15

Officials on both sides gave very general impression
of contemplating & preparing to avenge / revenge in
a nuclear war if started

a P.H. attack even without ~~war~~ (certainly; certainly too wrong)
of causing a missile war attack

us. from K 2-11 to justify terror
Paris (threat?)
8 km
Boston
(Camp: go after families)
Threaten?

[Neo-cons, PNAC: a Pearl Harbor attack on us
justified (myth.)

+ why has unending to get ... (King
Seymour
from
Egypt)

Andropov - deep distrust of America

(us, K, Herb?)

Abramson - to Cheney, at barbecue

X How do you detect premonition (premonition) of / when
you, threat (+ brief cap. for) on imminent
+ show strong signs of

FS? or, massive intervention in civil war?
uprising in East
Mideast

or confront it — FU vs. SU troops, or ally?

Easy, in reality, = 1958-64 —

SU didn't have threat to US
2nd strike

2.
(3-see
C-II/AA

But in 1983?

SU: US has good FS of superior

(= AOW to SAC, 1954-61

with superior SU force
+ intention.

After which provoked irresponsible NATO
behaviour, in Nov 83.

Atlantic
Bure

Analogue arising
as

SU from provoked level in 83 ^{now?}

(cf. Dulles...)

after Hering — Reagan in 81-83?

WHO, really?

and JFK C-II

CBS sp '65

Arthur Forge looked like prep for war
(see Dulles!) 40,000 US + NATO troops,
radio-silent 17K from US

K in C-II

UNLESS you "conclude" believe US
would do that — or that US could find some
SU couldn't suspect